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RECONCILIATION AND THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE COMMUNITY
The reassertion1 of the rule that a reconciliation, after a judg-
ment of separation from bed and board, does not re-establish the
community of property between spouses again presents the ques-
tion of its soundness. To the average layman, the rule in the very
nature of things would not seem to exist. To the lawyer, some
doubts as to its legal and logical foundations may well appear.
A judgment of separation from bed and board does not dis-
solve the marriage,2 but it dissolves the community of property.
The policy of the law, in providing in certain instances for sepa-
ration' rather than for immediate divorce,5 is to encourage the.
resumption of the marriage relation by giving the spouses an op-
portunity to become reconciled.' This policy is presumed to be
effectuated by the statutory provisions which declare inter alia
that a certain period of time must elapse after a judgment of sep-
aration before the matrimonial bond may be completely dis-
solved;7 and that a reconciliation of the spouses, whether after
the institution of the action8 or after a judgment," shall operate to
extinguish the action or the judgment respectively.10 It is further
provided that an action for separation based on causes arising
prior to the reconciliation shall also be extinguished by the hap-
pening of that event." A new suit must therefore be grounded on
1. Reichert v. Lloveras, 188 La. 447, 451, 177 So. 569, 570 (1937). Concern-
ing similar aspects of this problem in other jurisdictions, see Comment (1932)
20 Calif. L. Rev. 294; Note (1932) 76 A.L.R. 284. Cf. Butler v. Bolinger, 16 La.
App. 397, 133 So. 778 (1931).
2. Art. 136, La. Civil Code of 1870; McNeely v. McNeely, 47 La. Ann. 1321,
17 So. 928 (1895); Stallings v. Stallings, 177 La. 488, 148 So. 687 (1933).
3. Arts. 123, 136, 155, La. Civil Code of 1870; Williams v. Goss, 43 La. Ann.
868, 9 So. 750 (1891); Conrad v. Conrad, 170 La. 312, 127 So. 725 (1930); Butler
v. Bolinger, 16 La. App. 397, 133 So. 778 (1931). Cf. Brown v. Tauzin, 185 La.
86, 168 So. 502 (1936).
4. Art. 138, La. Civil Code of 1870.
5. Art. 139, La. Civil Code of 1870. Cf. La. Acts 25 of 1898, § 1, and 56 of
1932, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 2209].
6. Perkins v. Potts, 8 La. Ann. 14 (1853); Mack v. Handy, 39 La. Ann. 491,
2 So. 181 (1887); Martin v. Martin, 151 La. 530, 92 So. 46 (1922); Butler v.
Bolinger, 16 La. App. 397, 133 So. 778 (1931). Cf. Art. 89, La. Civil Code of 1870.
7. Art. 139, La. Civil Code of 1870. Cf. La. Acts 25 of 1898, § 1, and 56 of
1932, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 2209].
8. Art. 152, La. Civil Code of 1870. Spring v. Mendoza, 171 La. 461, 131 So.
299 (1930). Cf. Art. 154, La. Civil Code of 1870.
9. Succession of Liddell, 22 La. Ann. 9 (1870). See Von Hoven v. Weller,
38 La. Ann. 903, 904 (1886); Linzay v. Linzay, 51 La. Ann. 630, 635, 25 So. 308,
310 (1899). Cf. Art. 152, La. Civil Code of 1870.
10. Contra: New York, see Note (1930) 8 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 326; Note (1933)
85 A.L.R. 420, 423.
11. Art. 152, La. Civil Code of 1870; Bienvenu v. Her Husband, 14 La. Ann.
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causes arising subsequent to the reconciliation, but the privilege
is reserved to make use of the former causes to corroborate the
new allegation.12 To further effectuate this policy of preserving
the marriage, a reconciliation also has other effects. A judicial
grant of alimony pendente lite is extinguished. In some juris-
dictions, with certain limitations, 4 it operates to annul a prop-
erty settlement of the spouses.15 Thus, after a reconciliation the
only remaining effect of the Louisiana judgment of separation
from bed and board is the dissolution of the community.'
The Civil Code does not define what acts of the parties con-
stitute a sufficient reconciliation to bar an action for separation
or to annul a judgment to that effect. Although theoretically a
reconciliation is subjective,' it has been held that a conclusive
presumption attaches wherever the court finds the following fac-
tors present: (1) a mutual forgiveness-with complete knowledge
of the marital offense on the part of the injured spouse, and an
express or implied acceptance by the offender, and (2) a volun-
tary resumption of the marriage relation and marital cohabita-
tion. 8 Forgiveness has been distinguished from forbearance, 9
and a reconciliation has been held to have the same effect in
Louisiana that condonation or forgiveness has in common law
386 (1859); Schaub v. Schaub, 117 La. 727, 42 So. 249 (1906). Cf. J.F.C. v. M.E.,
His Wife, 6 Rob. 135 (La. 1843).
12. Art. 153, La. Civil Code of 1870; Cass v. Cass, 34 La. Ann. 611 (1882);
Shoeffner v. Shoeffner, 158 La. 933, 105 So. 18 (1925); Reichert v. Lloveras,
188 La. 447, 451, 177 So. 569, 570 (1937). Cf. Art. 154 La. Civil Code of 1870
(same exceptions apply to divorce action).
13. See Arts. 119, 148, 152, La. Civil Code of 1870; Player v. Player, 162 La.
229, 232, 110 So. 332, 333 (1926). This seems to be an exception to the general
rule: Note (1926) 40 A.L.R. 1227, 1239; Note (1933) 85 A.L.R. 420, 423; Note
(1930) 8 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 326.
14. Note (1926) 40 A.L.R. 1227; Note (1932) 27 Ill. L. Rev. 315; Note (1933)
85 A.L.R. 420.
15. Dillon v. Dillon, 103 Neb. 322, 171 N.W. 917 (1919); Rose v. Rogers,
264 S.W. 954 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Ward v. Ward, 81 Mont. 587, 264 Pac. 667
(1928). Cf. Nichols v. Her Husband, 7 La. Ann. 262 (1852); Art. 2446 (1), La.
Civil Code of 1870; Note (1926) 40 A.L.R. 1227; Note (1932) 27 Ill. L. Rev. 3f5;
Note (1933) 85 A.L.R. 420.
16. Crochet v. Dugas, 126 La. 285, 52 So. 495 (1910). See Arts. 123, 136, 155,
La. Civil Code of 1870; Williams v. Goss, 43 La. Ann. 868, 9 So. 750 (1891);
Conrad v. Conrad, 170 La. 312, 127 So. 725 (1930); Butler v. Bolinger, 16 La.
App. 397, 133 So. 778 (1931).
17. Maille, Divorce Laws of the State of Louisiana (1884) 85.
18. Martin v. Martin, 151 La. 530, 92 So. 46 (1922); Vicknair v. Terracina,
164 La. 117, 113 So. 787 (1927); Spence v. Spence, 162 La. 4, 110 So. 68 ((1926).
Cf. Maille, op. cit. supra note 17, at 85; Turnbull v. Turnbull, 23 Ark. 615
(1861); Odom v. Odom, 36 Ga. 286 (1867).
19. Martin v. Martin, 151 La. 530, 92 So. 46 (1922); Terrell v. Boarman,
34 La. Ann. 301 (1882); Balfe v. Balfe, 165 La. 283, 115 So. 489 (1928); New
v. New, 186 La. 1017, 173 So. 748 (1937).
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jurisdictions.20 It may be doubtful whether a single act of marital
cohabitation should be deemed sufficient to constitute a recon-
ciliation,21 but when other factors are present, the social implica-
tions together with the recognized public policy of preserving the
marriage unite to furnish a sufficient "reconciliation" 22 for the
courts to seal the marriage against dissolution.
Although the rule reasserted in the recent case of Reichert v.
Lloveras23 appears to be settled,24 namely, that after the occur-
rence of a reconciliation the sole remaining effect of the judg-
ment of separation is the dissolution of the community, an analy-
sis of the rationale employed by the courts in formulating this
principle fails to disclose any serious obstacle which would have
prevented a different conclusion. Since the judgment from which
the dissolution of the community flowed has become annulled in
this manner, should not that dissolution also be vitiated? Other-
wise, to retain the dissolution of the community under such cir-
cumstances appears to be permitting a separation of property in a
manner not recognized by the Civil Code2" or by the jurispru-
dence involving the action for separation of property per se.26
There is no adequate reason either in law or logic why the Su-
preme Court of Louisiana today might not formulate the contrary
rule, especially since it need not be bound by the common law
doctrine of stare decisis.27 The present principle was not founded
upon any specific article of the Code or upon any specific statute
-nor can it be so based today-but was evolved from an appli-
cation of the familiar principle of statutory construction embodied
in the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. By this process
of reasoning the Supreme Court took the position that, since the
redactors of the Civil Code did not include provision for the re-
20. Hill v. Hill, 112 La. 770, 36 So. 678 (1904).
21. Cf. 19 Corpus Juris 83-87.
22. Martin v. Martin, 151 La. 530, 92 So. 46 (1922); Spence v. Spence, 162
La. 4, 110 So. 68 (1926). Cf. Jacobs v. Tobelman, 36 La. Ann. 842 (1884); Lewis
v. Hurry, 119 La. 1035, 44 So. 856 (1907).
23. 188 La. 447, 451, 177 So. 569, 570 (1937).
24. Ford v. Kittredge, 26 La. Ann. 190 (1874); Crochet v. Dugas, 126 La.
285, 52 So. 495 (1910); Succession of Le Besque, 137 La. 567, 68 So. 956 (1915).
25. Arts. 2425 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870 (wife's action for separation
of property), 2332, 2392, 2399 (stipulation against a community in a marriage
contract), 1991, 2433, 2434 (creditor's rights relative to a separation of prop-
erty).
26. Davock v. Darcy, 6 Rob. 342 (La. 1844); Wolf & Clark v. Lowry, 10
La. Ann. 272 (1855); Caulk v. Picou & Husband, 23 La. Ann. 277 (1871). See
Daggett, The Community Property System of Louisiana (1931) 57-60.
27. Daggett, Dainow, Hebert and McMahon, A Reappraisal Appraised:
A Brief for the Civil Law of Louisiana (1937) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 12, 15-24;
Miami Corporation v. State of Louisiana, 186 La. 784, 799; 173 So. 315, 320
(1937).
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establishment of the community after a reconciliation, as is done
by the French Civil Code,'2 the judiciary was not at liberty to
formulate such a rule.29 No consideration was given to the fact
that there is no judgment upon which to base a dissolution of
the community since the judgment of separation ceased to exist
by virtue of the subsequent reconciliation. ° Furthermore, no
consideration was given in the cases to the effect of the present
rule upon the status of the community property as the economic
basis of the marriage and of the family. 1
The action for separation of property is a privilege accorded
to the wife alone and then only in certain specific instances.2
This privilege has been deemed so inviolate that the law has not
permitted any circumvention of it either by private agreement 8
or by a sale8 4 between the spouses. Nothing less than a judgment
28. Art. 1451, French Civil Code: "La communautd dissoute par la sdpara-
tion soit de corps et de biens, solt de biens seulement, peut tre rdtablie du
consentement des deux parties.
"ElZe ne peut 1'6tre que par un acto passd devant notaires et aveo minute,
dont une expddition doit tre affichdoe dans la forme de l'article 1445.
"En ce cas, la communautd rttablie reprend son effet du jour du marage;
les choses sont remises au mdme dtat que s'il n'y avait point eu de sdparation,
sans prdjudice ndanmoins de 1'exdcution des actes qui, dans cet intervalle, ont
pu dtre faits par Za femme en conformitd de P'article 1449.
"Touts convention par laquelle les dpoux rdtabliraient Jeur communautd
sous des conditions diffdrentes de celles qui Za r~glaient antdrieurment, est
nulle."
(Translation-Cachard, French Civil Code, 1930) "A community which is
dissolved by a separation, either from bed and board or of property only, can
be reestablished by consent of both parties.
"This can only be done by an instrument executed in the presence of no-
taries, of which a record remains and of which a certified copy is published
in the manner set forth in article 1445.
"In such case the community which is reestablished produces its effect
from the time of the marriage; things are put back in the same state as if
there had been no separation, without prejudice, nevertheless, to the fulfill-
ment of the acts which have been performed during such interval by the
wife in accordance with article 1449.
"Any agreement by which the husband and wife reestablish their com-
munity under different conditions from those which governed it previously
shall be void."
29. Ford v. Kittredge, 26 La. Ann. 190, 194 (1874).
30. Succession of Liddell, 22 La. Ann. 9 (1870). Cf. Arts. 152, 153, La. Civil
Code of 1870.
31. Cf. Ford v. Kittredge, 26 La. Ann. 190 (1874); Crochet v. Dugas, 126
La. 285, 52 So. 495 (1910); Succession of Le Besque, 137 La. 567, 68 So. 956
(1915).
32. Daggett, op. cit. supra note 26, at 56-58; Arts. 2425 et seq., La. Civil
Code of 1870.
33. Art. 2427, La. Civil Code of 1870; Muse v. Yarborough, 11 La. 521
(1838); Maxwell v. Maxwell, 1 La. App. 413 (1925). Art. 1443 (par, 2), French
Civil Code, provides: "Every voluntary separation [of property] is void."
34. Cf. Arts. 1790, 2446, La. Civil Code of 1870; Rush v. Landers, 107 La.
549, 32 So. 95, 57 L.R.A. 353 (1902); Kelly v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671
(1913); Loranger v. Citizens' Nat. Bank of Hammond, 162 La. 1054, 111 So.
418 (1927).
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of separation of property together with the fulfillment of the con-
ditions that must follow its rendition can effect a dissolution of
the community." In insisting upon a judicial decree the intention
of the legislature clearly was to prevent a dismemberment of the
community by mutual agreement-this being specifically prohib-
ited by the Code.36 Therefore, the effect of retaining the dissolu-
tion of the community and a "separation of goods and effects"
after the judgment of separation from bed and board has become
annulled by a reconciliation is to accomplish indirectly an end
which is reprobated by the law. This cannot be explained away
by classifying the result as an exception to the prohibition of
effecting a separation of property by mutual consent, for in addi-
tion there is no judicial decree of any kind upon which to ground
such separation.
In order that the judgment of separation of property accom-
plish the desired results an essential condition is that it must be
timely executed. 7 The earlier jurisprudence on this subject was
in confusion and indicated that where the judgment was accom-
panied by a decree for the payment of money it was only the
money judgment that fell under the tardy execution, and that the
judgment of separation of property stood, regardless of whether
there was timely execution or not.38 However, the matter has now
been clarified so that there is no longer any doubt but that the
judgment of separation also falls with the delayed execution in
such a case. 6 By analogy, does it not logically follow that the dis-
solution of the community of property flowing from the judgment
of separation from bed and board should also fall with the judg-
ment when a reconciliation takes place between the spouses?
By the adoption of a rule which will reinstate the community
35. Arts. 2425 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870. Cf. Daggett, op. cit. supra note
26, at 52, 55, 66-67. For other methods of effecting a dissolution of the com-
munity, see Arts. 123, 136, 155, 159, La. Civil Code of 1870.
36. Art. 2427, La. Civil Code of 1870.
37. Arts. 2428 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870; Muse v. Yarborough, 11 La.
521, 532 (1838); Bertie v. Walker, 1 Rob. 431, 432 (La. 1842); Chaff e v.
Scheen and Husband, 34 La. Ann. 684, 690 (1882). Exceptions to this rule ob-
tain where the judgment is accompanied by a decree for the payment of
money, and it is clear that an execution would have been a "vain thing"
[Holmes v. Barbin, 13 La. Ann. 474 (1858)]; and where the judgment of sep-
aration per se is not susceptible of execution [Davock v. Darcy, 6 Rob. 342
(La. 1844); Jones v. Widow & Heirs of Morgan, 6 La. Ann. 630 (1851); Holmes
v. Barbin, supra; Vickers v. Block, Britton & Co., 31 La. Ann. 672 (1879);
Carite v. Trotot, 105 U.S. 751, 26 L.Ed. 1223 (1881)].
38. Vickers v. Block, Britton & Co., 31 La. Ann. 672 (1879); Chaffe v.
Forcheimer, 35 La. Ann. 205 (1883); Jones v. Jones, 119 La. 677, 44 So. 429
(1907).
39. Larose v. Naquin, 150 La. 353, 90 So. 676 (1921); Art. 2428, La. Civil
Code of 1870.
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of property after a judgment of separation from bed and board
has been annulled by reconciliation, it is submitted that: (1) a
progressive step will be taken toward making the type of com-
munity property system obtaining in Louisiana still more equi-
table in its variations than the types existing in the seven other
states of the Union;40 (2) the community of property as the eco-
nomic basis of the family will become more stabilized so as to
fully effectuate the object of public policy to preserve the mar.
riage; and (3) since the average layman does not realize that the
original community is forever dissolved by a judgment of separa-
tion from bed and board because he reasonably believes that the
reconciliation has replaced the parties in their previous status in
every respect, this injustice to him will be completely eliminated.
The fact that the community is dissolved by the judgment of
separation from bed and board becomes even more serious when
it is realized that there is at present no recognized mode of re-
establishing it. Until 1916 the well-settled prohibition against
interspousal contracts4'1 caused the courts to conclude that once
the community was dissolved, it could never be re-established be-
tween the same parties.42 Nevertheless, since the passage of the
so-called "married women's emancipatory acts,"43 the issue is
raised as to whether the spouses may now contract with each
other during the marriage in order to re-establish such a dissolved
community. The general problem is whether the wife may now
freely contract with her husband in any case,44 and the Louisiana
Supreme Court has held that where the husband and wife have
entered into a joint lease of community and separate property to
a third person, such a contract is valid45-but the court was care-
ful to point out that it was unnecessary in that case to decide
whether the emancipatory acts were sufficiently comprehensive to
sustain the validity of contracts between husband and wife in any
other situation. 4" Nevertheless, in the light of these acts the judi-
40. Arizona, California, Idaho, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas, and Wash-
ington. See Daggett, op. cit. supra note 26, at 3, 200-206.
41. See Arts. 1790, 2446, La. Civil Code of 1870; Rush v. Landers, 107 La.
549, 32 So. 95, 57 L.R.A. 353 (1902); Kelly v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671
(1913); Loranger v. Citizens' Nat. Bank of Hammond, 162 La. 1054, 111 So.
418 (1927); Comment (1933) 8 Tulane L. Rev. 106, 111.
42. Ford v. Kittredge, 26 La. Ann. 190 (1874); Crochet v. Dugas, 126 La.
285, 52 So. 495 (1910); Succession of Le Besque, 137 La. 567, 68 So. 956 (1915).
43. La. Acts. 94 of 1916, 244 of 1918, 219 of 1920, 132 of 1926, 283 of 1928
[Dart's Stats. (1932) §§ 2169-2173].
44. Comment, supra note 41, at 115-117.
45. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Calcasieu Real Estate and Oil Co., 185 La.
751, 170 So. 785 (1936).
46. 185 La. at 773, 170 So. at 792.
1939]
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ciary might find sufficient legal reason to sustain the validity of a
contractual re-establishment of the community.47 However, this
method would not be sufficiently remedial for the layman who did
not realize the necessity for the execution of such a contract. Fur-
thermore, as one writer has suggested, 4 the opposing interests of
contracting parties leads to law suits; therefore, to allow inter-
spousal contracts would not be in accord with the tenor of the
Code which fosters marital harmony."
If the judiciary does not see fit to continue the community
after a reconciliation, and if it should not interpret the new eman-
cipatory acts to allow re-establishment of the community by con-
tract, then legislative action is necessary. The following sugges-
tions would provide a proper legislative remedy: (1) to permit
a re-establishment of the community by agreement of the spouses
as is done in France 50 and Quebec,51 or as was suggested in the
47. This would seem possible despite the provision in La. Act 283 of 1928,
§ 5 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 2173] which states: "Nothing herein contained shall
modify or affect the laws relating to the matrimonial community of acquets
and gains." If contracts between husband and wife are possible, there is log-
ical argument for upholding a contractual re-establishment of the community
without the necessity for a legislative remedy. The effect of the 1928 eman-
cipatory act being to remove the general incapacity of married women to con-
tract as set forth in Articles 1782, 1786 and 1790, such effect should not be ex-
tended to override the special interspousal contractual prohibitions provided
in the Code such as Article 2427 (voluntary separation of community prop-
erty prior to a dissolution of the marriage) and Article 2446 (interspousal
contracts of sale). However, as there is no special interspousal contractual
prohibition with respect to re-establishment of the community, it is submitted
that the 1928 act may be extended to permit an interspousal contract of this
nature. Cf. Comment, supra note 41, at 115-117. See Thompson-Ritchie Grocery
Co. v. Graham, 15 La. App. 534, 536, 132 So. 394, 395 (1931), where there is
dictum to the effect that contracts between husband and wife are possible.
However, see Art. 1790, La. Civil Code of 1870; Didier v. Pardue & Pardue,
144 So. 762, 763 (La. App. 1932) (La. Act 283 of 1928 was not mentioned).
48. Comment, supra note 41, at 117.
49. Cf. Arts. 119, 120, 2399, 2404, La. Civil Code of 1870.
50. Art. 1451, French Civil Code. For the English text of the article, see
note 28, supra.
51. Art. 217, Quebec Civil Code (as amended by 21 Geo. V [1931] ch. 101,
§ 6): "Husband and wife thus separated [by a judicial separation from bed
and board], for any cause whatever, may at any time reunite and thereby
put an end to the effects of the separation.
"By such reunion, the husband reassumes his rights, but the consorts
remain separate as to property, unless they re-establish community of prop-
erty in conformity with article 1320."
Prior to the amendment, the last paragraph of the article read: "By
such reunion, the husband reassumes all his rights over the person and
property of his wife, the community of property is re-established of right and,
for the future, is considered as never having been dissolved."
Art. 1320, Quebec Civil Code (as amended by 21 Geo. V [1931] ch. 101, §
23): "Community dissolved by separation from bed and board, or by separa-
tion of property only, may be re-established, with the consent of the parties,
in the first case when the consorts have become re-united, but, in both cases,
such re-establishment can only be effected by an act before a notary as an
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1910 Proposed Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code; 52 (2) to
clearly remove any disabilities attaching to interspousal contracts
so far as to enable the spouses to re-establish the community;5 3 or
(3) to change the time when the marriage contract may be made,5"
in order to accomplish this result.
The most effective remedy, however, would be obtained
through a judgment of our highest state court declaring that a
reconciliation of the spouses subsequent to a judgment of separa-
tion from bed and board operates to replace the husband and wife
in the same status in every respect-including the re-establish-
ment of the community of property. No legal obstacle stands in
the path of overruling the prior jurisprudence on this subject,
especially since the courts of Louisiana need not be bound by
judicial precedent. From these considerations it would appear
original, a copy of which is deposited in the office of the court which rendered
the judgment of separation, and is joined to the record in the case; and men-
tion of such deposit must be made in the register after such judgment and in
the special register wherein the separation is inscribed, pursuant to article
1097 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
Art. 1321, Quebec Civil Code: "In the case of the preceding article, the
community so re-established resumes its effect from the day of the marriage;
things are replaced in the same condition as if there had been no separation;
without prejudice, however, to such acts as the wife may have done in the
interval, in conformity with article 1318.
"Every agreement by which the consorts re-establish their community
upon conditions different from those by which it was previously governed, is
void."
52. Art. 150, Projet of the Commission on Revision of the Civil Code
(1910), was inserted as a new article in the proposed new Code and read as
follows: "If, after separation from bed and board, the spouses be reconciled,
they may re-establish the community under the conditions as it originally
existed, by an act to that effect before a notary and two witnesses, duly re-
corded in the conveyance records of the parish of the domicile of the parties.
"They may even restore the property, or any part thereof, or its proceeds,
which belonged to the former community at the date of the judgment, by
making a declaration to that effect in the act, and describing the property;
otherwise the re-establishment of the community is to take effect from the
date of the recording of the act.
"The remarrying of the spouses, after final divorce, will create a new
community between them, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary, by
the marriage contract. A community dissolved on account of the financial
condition of the husband cannot be re-established."
The Commission was appointed under the authority of La. Act. 160 of 1908.
For an historical account of the proposal for a revision of the Civil Code of
1870 under the auspices of the Louisiana Bar Association, see (1937) 11 Tu-
lane L. Rev. 213, 228-229. The bill embodying the projet was rejected in the
Legislature at the instance of the Bar Association, not because there was any
objection to the particular new article proposed, but upon other grounds.
See Special Report, Code Revision Committee (1913) 14 La. Bar Ass'n Rep.
345.
53. Cf. Daggett, op. cit. supra note 26, at 205.
54. Ibid.
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that greater justice would be accomplished by overturning the
rule reasserted in the principal case.
W. T. PEGUES
JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD*
Since its creation, the National Labor Relations Board has
disposed of about a thousand cases. Of this vast number, the Su-
preme Court of the United States has passed on the Board's exer-
cise of jurisdiction in seven.' About forty others have been re-
viewed by the various Circuit Courts of Appeals.
Although the decisions of the federal courts are of primary im-
portance concerning the permissible area within which the Board
may exercise its jurisdiction, nevertheless we may not overlook
the attitude of the Board itself toward the scope of its powers.
2
The expressed intention of the Administrator of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to be guided in the application of that act by rul-
ings of the National Labor Relations Boards gives added emphasis
to jurisdictional findings by the Board.
All the cases which have been reviewed by the Supreme Court
have been approved insofar as the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Board is concerned. Of these, the Jones and Laughlin Steel Cor-
poration case is first in importance. In approving the constitution-
ality of the National Labor Relations Act, the Court gave in broad
outline the guiding theory applicable to the test of federal power
to control:
"Although activities may be intrastate in character when
separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial
* Established by the National Labor Relations Act, § 3, 49 Stat. 449, 451
(1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 153 (Supp. 1938).
1. N.L.R.B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81
L.Ed. 893 (1937); Associated Press v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct. 650, 81
L.Ed. 953 (1937); N.L.R.B. v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58,
57 S.Ct. 645, 81 L.Ed. 921 (1937); N.L.R.B. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S.
49, 57 S.Ct. 642, 81 L.Ed. 918 (1937); Washington, Virginia and Maryland
Coach Co. v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 142, 57 S.Ct. 648, 81 L.Ed. 965 (1937); Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 131 (1938); Santa Cruz
Fruit Packing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 303 U.S. 453, 58 S.Ct. 656, 82 L.Ed. 954 (1938).
2. See Despres and Myer, The National Labor Relations Board-Decisions
of its First Year (1936) 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 97.
3. 3 Labor Rel. Rep. 91 (1938).
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